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Securities cases commonly entail claims for millions of dollars
in damages. A securities violation may affect thousands of inves-
tors, and each may seek to recover the difference between the price
paid for the stock and its current value. Because securities litiga-
tion typically accompanies some catastrophe in the fortunes of the
firm, the claims quickly mount up.
Although securities cases are a staple of modern litigation,
there are no accepted rules for the computation of damages. The
principal statutes contain a number of different articulations, rang-
ing from rescission to "profits" to unspecified "damages."' The
cases contain a melange of rules. Some courts emphasize the plain-
tiff's out-of-pocket loss; some emphasize the defendant's profits;
some award rescission and some restitution; all too often a court
will give up and announce that the district court has discretion to
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I Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) allows those who purchased
unregistered securities (or who purchased from sellers who made material misrepresenta-
tions) to recover the price paid "less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the
tender of such security, or. . .damages if he no longer owns the security." 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1982). Section 11(e) of the 1933 Act provides for the award of the price paid less value at
the time of suit or sale, when there was a misrepresentation in the registration statement,
but it creates a defense that the difference is not recoverable if it "represents other than the
depreciation in value of such security" resulting from the event creating the liability. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982). Section 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)
establishes "damages sustained" as the standard in certain manipulative-practices cases, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(e) (1982), and section 18(a) of the 1934 Act covers "damages caused" by reli-
ance on misstatements in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1982). The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
376, § 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1264, 1264-65 (amending § 21(d) of
the 1934 Act, to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)), allows a court to assess a penalty of
up to three times the defendants' "profits" from inside trading. There are variations on each
of these themes.
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-fashion "a remedy to suit the particular case"-as if there were no
need for legal rules to evaluate the significance and effects of the
facts of "the particular case."' 2 The academic literature is little bet-
ter. Scholars frequently observe that the rules are poorly articu-
lated and inconsistent.3 But recognition of the problem does not
lead to a neat solution. The American Law Institute's Federal Se-
curities Code, designed to serve as a model for legislation and in-
terpretation, contains all of the competing rules and caps off the
confusion with a proviso that all of the rules "may be varied on a
showing that a different definition of rescission or measure of dam-
ages would be plainly more appropriate on consideration of such
factors as the plaintiff's loss, the defendant's profit, and the deter-
rent effect of the particular type of liability."4
Our thesis is that things appear to be more chaotic than they
are. Some fairly simple principles lead to intelligible rules of dam-
ages. These rules are not only elegant in theory but also applied in
practice. The rhetoric that appears in opinions does not always
track the analysis we supply, but neither do the courts' judgments
follow their rhetoric.
The principles we use are derived from the economics of sanc-
tions. The economics of sanctions starts from the proposition that
the objective of a legal rule is to deter certain undesirable behavior
without simultaneously deterring (too much) beneficial behavior.
We would like to design rules that minimize the sum of the losses
from (a) undesirable behavior that the rules permit, (b) desirable
behavior that the laws deter, and (c) the costs of enforcing the
rules. The legal system balances these competing objectives
through the choice of sanctions as well as through the choice of
substantive doctrines. Indeed, a thoughtful selection of the sanc-
tion may promote desirable outcomes even though the substantive
rule is necessarily incomplete or overbroad.
Though the terminology we use-optimal sanctions, allocative
efficiency, and the like-is alien to securities law, the objective of
deterrence is not. Legislators and judges commonly justify their
2 Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982), is the source of the quota-
tion. For compendia of the approaches of different courts, see ThoMAs HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.7 (1985); Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5
Cases, 65 GEo. L.J. 1093 (1977).
3 Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative
to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1984), is an especially effective dissection of the
cases.
' FEDERAL SEC. CODE § 1723(e) (1980). The commentary announces that perhaps
"'there is no law of damages under Rule 10b-5.'" Id. comment 1.
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decisions in terms of desire for deterrence, fear of overdeterrence,
and concern about the costs of the legal system. These are funda-
mentally economic concepts, and the economics of sanctions is
therefore a suitable tool for understanding and shaping the content
of the rules. The decision to buy, hold, or sell a security is based on
a desire for economic gain. Securities often are traded in fairly
well-functioning markets, so that the premises of economic analy-
sis are satisfied more easily here than in many other parts of the
law. Investors frequently are wealthy and sophisticated; other in-
vestors often are represented by agents (brokers, investment bank-
ers, managers of pension funds and mutual funds) who not only
are sophisticated but also can react on short notice to new infor-
mation, opportunities, and rules. The stated objective of securities
law is to make markets function efficiently-not to redistribute in-
come or reshape preferences. True, people sometimes say that the
function of securities law is "the protection of investors" or "com-
pensation for wrongs," but these are just restatements of the objec-
tive of efficient operation of the markets. When markets efficiently
respond to information, the price of securities adjusts, and this
protects all investors-even uninformed ones. 5
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the princi-
ples of optimal sanctions. We show why damages for ambiguous
conduct (such as nondisclosure) should approximate the net loss
that wrongful conduct imposes on others. Lower awards permit too
many wrongs; higher awards deter too many beneficial transac-
tions. The awards for some intentionally wrongful conduct (such as
deliberate lies) should be higher, because there is no offsetting
benefit. Often it is hard to compute net losses, but well-functioning
securities markets produce much of the information that underlies
this computation. We show how changes in the level of prices in
the market affect damages and why different rules are appropriate
for transactions in illiquid markets.
Part II applies these principles to many of the problems en-
countered in securities litigation. We discuss fraud in the issuance
of securities of both public and close corporations, fraud and non-
disclosure in the aftermarket, insider trading, and brokers' miscon-
'Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA.
L. REv. 669, 693-94 (1984). This mechanism obviously works imperfectly even in the most
liquid markets, and in markets for close corporations it may not work at all. See Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. Rav. 549 (1984); J. Gordon &
L. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research (Dec. 20,
1984) (unpublished manuscript, N.Y.U. School of Law).
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duct. We show that many of the legal treatments follow reasonably
closely the distinctions implied in the economics of sanctions. The
legal rules governing punitive damages and trading in the
aftermarket do not correspond to the economic principles as
closely as do other rules.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF OPTIMAL SANCTIONS IN SECURITIES
MARKETS
A. The "Efficient Offense"
Securities are specialized contracts. Investors agree to contrib-
ute capital and bear the risk of the enterprise; in exchange they get
promises of a role in running the business and a share of the re-
turns. A "securities fraud" is a form of breach of contract. One
party fails to furnish another with information required in the reg-
ular course of dealing, or he furnishes information but defaults in
his duties, making the information inaccurate. We should expect a
close relationship between damages in securities cases and dam-
ages in other contract cases.
Damages in most of contract law mediate among the costs of
extreme positions. At one extreme, the legal rule could ensure that
parties keep all their contracts. Draconian damages rules would do
this. At the other extreme, the legal rule could permit breach
whenever convenient to the breaching party. A rule of zero dam-
ages would have this effect. Courts do not adopt either extreme.
Plaintiffs in contract cases commonly recover the lost value of the
contract (the "expectation" measure of damages). A person who
contracted for a ton of peas, at $1 per pound, to be delivered on
July 1 in New York, is entitled on breach to the difference between
$1 and the market price of peas on July 1 in New York-the price
at which he can "cover" the contract. The aggrieved party cannot
get "lost profits" or "consequential damages" recoveries unless the
contract applies to a unique good.
The measure of damages in contract cases permits parties to a
contract to commit "efficient breaches." Suppose the seller of the
peas has them on hand in California, and the price of peas rises to
$1.10 per pound in California. The best disposition of these peas is
to make them available to eat in California (where buyers value
them more highly) rather than to ship them across the country to
New York, where the current price may be only $1.05. The dam-
ages rule induces the seller to divert the peas to California; the
buyer may secure peas for $1.05 in New York, and the seller will
pay the buyer five cents per pound. The rule permits the parties to
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take account of the costs of performance of their contract and of
changing relative values. It acts as if the parties had the foresight
to negotiate about such contingencies. Damages rules may approxi-
mate the results of contracts that provide for all contingencies.
It is easy to see that there may be an "optimal level of breach"
in ordinary contracts. It is not so obvious that this is so with secur-
ities contracts. Nevertheless, the same principles apply. "Truth,"
like all good things, is costly to produce. The person selling securi-
ties must investigate the business- venture at hand and package the
information in a form that investors can understand. The process
of acquiring and packaging information can be exceptionally ex-
pensive. Whole industries-accounting, investment banking, much
of the bar, much of the financial press-are the embodiments of
the costs of investigation and certification of information about
firms and their securities. For any complex business, it is impossi-
ble to find and present "everything material" in a space less than
that of a decent-sized library.
B. Efficient Liability Rules and Efficient Damages Rules
Investors would like to reduce the costs of finding and
presenting the truth about firms and their securities. Because there
are benefits in less than total candor-ranging from a reduction in
paperwork to the ability to hide vital facts from one's business ri-
val-it is important to establish legal principles that recognize the
value of nondisclosure. And there are two ways to do this, just as
with other contracts. For ordinary contracts the two methods are
increased specification of excuses and other contingencies in the
contract (or implied in law), and the selection of the measure of
damages. For securities contracts the two methods are increased
specification of the substantive law (such as careful attention to
"materiality" and other substantive doctrines), and the selection of
the measure of damages.
The legal rules together tell people how much investigation to
conduct, how much care to take, and when they need not disclose.
Either freedom from liability or low damages in the event of liabil-
ity will lead firms to conserve resources and not disclose. Yet the
two approaches-substance and remedies-are not always equiva-
lent. They have different implications for the treatment of uncer-
6 See ShaveU, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 121
(1984); Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980); see
also Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 JJL. & EcoN. 691 (1983).
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tainty. Suppose investors would agree that it is not worthwhile for
managers to investigate and discuss every remote business contin-
gency; the investors agree that it is better to take the chance that a
remote (but undisclosed) bad event will come to pass than to incur
the certain costs of investigating many remote possibilities. The le-
gal system can permit this to occur either by defining a particular
contingency as "not material" (hence nondisclosure is not a viola-
tion) or by saying that the nondisclosure is a violation but the
damages nil.
The "materiality" approach requires courts to investigate just
how likely an unlikely event may have been. Because the stakes of
the case are apt to be high (damages in cases of undisclosed "mate-
rial" facts must be high, or the withheld facts would not be
deemed "material"), the parties will invest heavily in litigation.
But it will prove hard to reconstruct after the fact the probability
of not-well-investigated events, and so litigation of this sort is apt
to be chancy as well as costly. The damages solution could reduce
the importance of the answer to this difficult question. A low
threshold of "materiality" requires the seller of securities to decide
for itself whether the costs of additional investigation and disclos-
ure are worthwhile in light of the damages that will be awarded if
something goes wrong. If damages are set correctly, the seller will
investigate and disclose up to the point where an additional dollar
spent on this activity produces just one more dollar for investors.
The person with the best access to information will make the deci-
sion on the spot, saving the resources that could be spent on ex
post inquests years later in court. In many cases it will be much
more efficient to use a damages rule to induce the seller to make
the decision than to have a judicial inquiry into the optimal level
of disclosure.7
Sellers of securities must continually decide how best to pro-
tect investors. They may investigate thoroughly and disclose all
possibilities; they may hire experts (who may be more or less
skilled); they may rely on financial intermediaries such as invest-
ment bankers to do the investigation and replace "complete" dis-
closure with the assurance of their reputations; they may choose
7 This is identical in principle to the use of damages in antitrust to induce manufactur-
ers-which have the best access to information about the costs of production under different
market structures-to trade productive efficiency gains against allocative efficiency losses.
See Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MxcH. L. REV.
1155, 1157-59 (1982); Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHL L.
REv. 652 (1983).
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not to disclose certain things at all because they fear that disclos-
ure could tip off rivals to ongoing developments; they may choose
to leave certain investigating to the investors. All of these strate-
gies have associated costs and benefits. Well-chosen damages rules
can induce sellers to select the strategy with the greatest net bene-
fits. This is what we mean by the commission of "efficient of-
fenses." The legal system may call some nondisclosure an offense
not for the purpose of extirpating all conduct of that class, but for
the purpose of bringing home to the decisionmaker the costs of its
conduct. The rules in securities cases may have the same function
as the rules in contract cases (which are not designed to abolish
breach) or tort cases (which are not designed to abolish risk-taking
behavior). In contract and tort, like securities, rules may serve the
purpose of inducing the most knowledgeable party to compare the
costs and benefits of its acts.
Often, though, it is better to find no liability than to fine-tune
damages rules. The assumption that liability rules are beneficial in
securities law rests on answers to a series of difficult factual inquir-
ies. Damages actions create costs as well as benefits. Though infor-
mation is the basis of all contracts, many contracts are enforced
best through self-help remedies rather than actions at law.8 Private
actions for damages in securities cases create significant costs. In-
vestors routinely sue managers whenever the price of stock falls
dramatically, and it is very hard for a court to determine whether
the decline was caused by some extrinsic event or by something
known to managers, but not disclosed, at an earlier time. If courts
equate bad outcomes with bad actions, the ensuing damages will
do more to discourage the conduct of business enterprises than to
encourage the revelation of important facts.9
A number of devices, some contractual and some imposed au-
tomatically by markets, create incentives for managers to disclose
information no matter what the law of damages may be.10 The de-
l See Klein & Leffier, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Perform-
ance, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 615 (1981); Knoeber, An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contrac-
tual Reliability, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1983); Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agree-
ments, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980); Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 Ahd EcoN. REv. 519 (1983). For an application to the law of corpora-
tions, see Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corpo-
rate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming).
I See Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans-Union Case, Bus. LAw.
(forthcoming).
10 We collect some of the reasons in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 673-77,
687-92. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence,
9 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 539 (1984), collects much of the data.
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cision whether and how much information to disclose is one of a
very large number of business decisions that managers must make.
Each of these decisions affects the value of the firm and thus the
price of its stock. Whether liability rules enforced by investors' liti-
gation will cause managers to make decisions more favorable to in-
vestors is a difficult empirical question.
Most business decisions of managers are all but immune from
judicial scrutiny. There is neither liability nor damages, so long as
the managers' judgment is not affected by personal bias. Managers
are not liable even for negligence. Securities law, though it contains
some devices that limit the scope of liability,1 permits damages to
be awarded much more freely. Courts decline to defer to the sort of
managerial judgments to which they routinely defer in other kinds
of litigation. But in this article we do not question further the
scope of the rules. We assume that the existing allocation of func-
tions among liability rules, damages rules, and freedom from liabil-
ity is roughly correct.
C. The Nature of Optimal Sanctions in Securities Transactions
1. Damages as a Measure of Net Harm. When a particular
activity may have both costs and benefits, the optimal sanction is
the net harm that activity imposes on other people divided by the
probability that the activity will be detected and prosecuted suc-
cessfully.12 Suppose, for example, that a failure to investigate and
disclose some contingency saves $100 in the costs of investigation
and has different effects on two classes of investors: one class loses
$200 if the contingency comes to pass, and another class gains $50.
We postpone for the moment whether money losses sustained by
investors are the same as real economic harm. We also assume that
investors want firms to maximize their expected value, which is
equivalent to assuming that investors are risk neutral."
" See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (liability must be based
on deception rather than mismanagement); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1976) (omitted information must be material); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (plaintiff must establish wilful or reckless conduct to recover under Rule 10b-5); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only purchasers or sellers of securi-
ties may recover damages under Rule 10b-5); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
12 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968), is the seminal treatment. See also Landes, supra note 7; Friedman, Efficient Institu-
tions for the Private Enforcement of Law, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1984); Polinsky & Shavell,
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984).
13 Investors in public corporations have a broad choice of investments and can hedge
risk by purchasing a diversified portfolio of securities. Under these circumstances, they pre-
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If the nondisclosure is sure to be detected and prosecuted,
then the appropriate award is $150, the net harm. The firm, ob-
serving that it must pay $150 in damages to save $100, will conduct
the investigation. If the saving from not conducting the investiga-
tion is $175, by contrast, the firm will save the costs of investigat-
ing and pay the damages. Investors as a whole will be $25 better
off as a result, because the investors ultimately are the benefi-
ciaries of "the firm's" savings. If the probability of successful pros-
ecution is one in two, the damages should be doubled. Then over a
run of, say, ten similar cases, the firm would expect $175 in savings
per case (totalling $1750) and would expect to pay $300 in each of
five cases (totalling $1500) and would again save the resources. The
firm would conserve the costs of investigation whenever the costs
exceeded $150, just as it should.
To say that "the firm" pays the award is to raise some inter-
esting questions. Who is "the firm," when the investors and other
participants change daily? Does "the firm" include accountants
and others who participate in the decision about how much to in-
vestigate and disclose? These are important practical questions,
but we put them to one side in this article. The people participat-
ing in the venture-whether as investors, managers, accountants,
or lawyers-may enter into contracts for indemnity or insurance.
These contracts may move liability from the target initially se-
lected by the law to the person who can do the investigation and
disclosure at least cost. In order not to complicate the presentation
unduly, we use the fiction that there is just one actor, "the firm."
2. Other Considerations of Optimality. Although the "net
harm" rule creates the right incentives for people deciding how
much to investigate and disclose, it does not necessarily send the
appropriate signals to the other actors. It may be essential to ad-
just the damages to avoid some collateral problems.
a. Investors' incentives to take precautions. Investors do not
fer rules that maximize the expected value of the securities whenever capital markets are
competitive. See Makowski, Competition and Unanimity Revisited, 73 Ah. EcoN. REv. 329
(1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 711-14
(1982). The capital markets are quite competitive; of all markets, they come closest to the
atomistic ideal. True, not all investors diversify their holdings. But they can do so, and
when they do not, they simply are acting as if not risk averse. Our approach does not re-
quire diversification; it is enough that those who are risk averse can diversify their holdings
or purchase risk-free instruments such as T-Bills. The pool of investors in public corpora-
tions therefore will act as if risk neutral. Things may be otherwise for closely held corpora-
tions. Here it is difficult to diversify, and it may be appropriate to assume that investors are
risk averse. We develop later on some other implications of the difference between public
and close corporations.
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respond to "net harm" directly. In the example we gave above, the
nondisclosure of a fact helped some investors and harmed others.
The investors who stood to lose $200 might attempt to protect
their own interests. They could hire agents (such as investment ad-
visers) to investigate on their behalf. Yet they ought not to have
such an incentive; by hypothesis the optimal investment in infor-
mation is either zero or an amount less than $150 to be spent by
the firm. In general, expenses by investors on investigation are a
substitute for effective private incentives or legal rules that induce
optimal disclosures. 14 It would be nice to arrange a damages mea-
sure that removes the incentive for private investigation. Yet in
the example we have given, only a certain award of $200 to the
"losing" investors would remove their incentive to investigate. This
is too large an award from the perspective of the firm. If it must
pay $200 to the "losing" investors, it will spend up to that amount
on investigation itself, and again (by hypothesis) that is too much.
This example illustrates two things. First, it is important that
the rule of damages compensate investors to at least some extent
for their private losses, and not just for social or net loss. Too little
compensation leads to too much private investigation. If the victim
of a trespass could not obtain compensation for private harms, po-
tential victims would spend money erecting unnecessary barri-
cades; the award of damages prevents this.15 Second, a rule provid-
ing compensation for private injuries may lead firms to invest too
much in investigation and disclosure. As a result, there may be no
one "best" remedy. It is necessary to choose some system of sanc-
tions that mediates these conflicting objectives.
b. Investors' incentives to enforce the rules. It is important
to give people the right incentives to enforce the rules and thus
compel others to pay the damages that induce them to make cor-
rect decisions. The structure of rewards should induce enforcers to
expend resources finding and prosecuting violations until, at the
margin, the last dollar of resources spent on enforcement reduces
the social costs of nondisclosure by just one dollar. This is almost
impossible to achieve, for at least three reasons.
First, only by accident will the damages in a particular case
14 See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, No. 84-2141, slip op. at 5-
11 (7th Cir. May 13, 1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 673-77; Hirshleifer, The
Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM.
ECON. REv. 561 (1971) (discussing net costs of acquiring information that predicts the future
without changing it).
15 Landes & Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT'L R.v. L. &
ECON. 127, 131-32 (1981).
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(the standard against which the enforcer will compare its expendi-
tures) equal the social loss from future, similar decisions about dis-
closure. Second, the rule that damages be increased in response to
a lower probability of successful prosecution implies an inverse re-
lation between the multiplier and the probability of prosecution.
But this cannot easily be achieved in a system of private enforce-
ment. The higher the multiplier, the higher the payoff from suit;
the higher the payoff, the more people will spend investigating and
bringing suits. This may lead both to excessive net penalties and to
excessive enforcement.16
Third, if the victims of nondisclosure or fraud own enforce-
ment rights in proportion to their injuries, each will spend too lit-
tle investigating and prosecuting the offense because each can ob-
tain redress only for his own loss. Each person's activities in
investigation and prosecution produce a gain for former and future
victims, a gain that cannot be appropriated. One way around this
is to assign the enforcement right to a single "entity"-usually the
"class" in a class action. It turns out, however, that this just
changes the locus of the problem. Now the question becomes: who
speaks for the class? Each of the class's agents (attorneys and ex-
perts) faces the problem of unappropriable gains. It is possible to
devise elegant mechanisms through which would-be enforcers
could purchase enforcement rights for lump sum payments; quite a
number of such mechanisms would in theory overcome the
problems in question. These are not available in our legal system,
however, and will not work if enforcers are risk averse (as most are,
even plaintiffs' lawyers with portfolios of claims that help them
hedge risk).
c. Unconditional deterrence. The "net harm" rule for dam-
ages applies only when there are efficient offenses. The "net harm"
rule induces the firm to spend the right amount in investigation
and dissemination of information. Many kinds of conduct have no
associated savings. Take, for example, deliberate lying about the
firm's assets. A firm puts out a prospectus saying that it has 10,000
tons of tobacco in inventory, when all of the firm's officers know
that the actual amount is 1000 tons. The lie does not enable the
firm to save the costs of investigation; to the contrary, it is usually
16 Compare Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974), with Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975). If the penalty were high enough, of course, it would deter all
improper activity and there would be no over-enforcement, indeed no enforcement at all.
But we are concerned about less draconian penalties.
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more costly to fabricate a lie and cover up the traces than to tell
the truth, and lies create incentives for others to investigate to
pierce the disguise. Here the legal rule should be designed to deter
unconditionally-not to force the firm to compare costs and bene-
fits, but to channel its conduct into approved forms. The very stiff
penalties for armed robbery channel behavior into the more ac-
cepted form of negotiation; the would-be robber can negotiate with
merchants, and the rule induces him to do so rather than resort to
force. One can safely ignore a claim of "efficient robbery," and so
too with many kinds of fraud. If we are certain enough that some
kinds of conduct are always inappropriate, then no penalty is too
high. (This is a big "if." When the legal system makes mistakes,
whether in choosing which conduct to proscribe or in concluding
that the defendant committed the proscribed behavior, severe pen-
alties often deter desirable conduct.)
d. Marginal deterrence. Not quite "no" penalty. It is neces-
sary to preserve deterrence on the margin. If the expected penalty
for telling a small lie is the dissembler's entire wealth, then no one
will stop with a small lie. If you're going to tell a lie, you might as
well tell a whopper. Any system of penalties must graduate the an-
ticipated sanction with the seriousness of the offense in order to
avoid driving offenders to the high end of the seriousness scale. 17
e. No right rule. The upshot of this discussion is that the
"net harm" rule, though a useful starting point for assessing the
incentive to make appropriate disclosures, is not a satisfactory rule
for all cases. It must be modified to preserve incentives to enforce
the rules and to prevent excessive precautions by investors. It may
be abandoned when the kind of statement or omission in question
cannot be thought efficient. A few other modifications are appro-
priate when the firm in question is closely held. We return to these
issues. Now, though, we specify what a "net harm" rule would use
as a starting point.
3. Finding the Net Harm. There are at least four compo-
nents of the net harm in securities transactions. First, and usually
largest, is the net transfer to the offender. When A steals $100
from B and keeps the money, the transfer of wealth is part of the
harm. If A is Robin Hood and gives $90 to C, then the net transfer
to the offender is only $10. To see why the net transfer rather than
the gross transfer is the right measure, consider a variation of the
example we presented above. Suppose the managers of a firm de-
17 See Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).
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cide to skimp on investigating a contingency that affects the rela-
tive rights of two classes of investors. If the contingency comes to
pass, Class #1 loses $200, Class #2 gains $40, and the managers
gain $10 personally. The net harm is $150: the $200 loss less the
$50 gain ($40 + $10). The parties as a group would like "the firm"
to conduct the investigation and disseminate the information only
if the costs of doing so are less than $150.18 If the legal rule levies a
judgment totalling $150 (against the firm and the managers in any
combination), the managers will take steps to avoid that result
whenever they can do so for less than $150. A higher penalty leads
to excessive investment in information; a rule that lets those in
charge of the decision keep personal profit also warps the judg-
ment. So one can think of the first component of the net-harm rule
this way: the harm is the gross loss minus any benefit created by
the transaction (whether the benefit is a transfer to investors or
the saving of resources in investigation).
The second source of harm from fraud and nondisclosure is
the total cost of carrying out the offense, unmasking the offense,
taking precautions against similar offenses, and litigating about of-
fenses. The cost of hefty locks and burglar alarm systems is part of
the cost of theft; the cost of extra resources spent investigating the
truth of statements about securities is part of the social cost of
securities offenses. These costs include the costs that "truthful"
firms must spend to distinguish themselves from slipshod and un-
truthful firms. (Firms bear the costs of carrying out frauds "auto-
matically," however; these are "costs of doing business." We need
not include them a second time in the penalty for the offense.)
The final sources of harm are related reductions in the alloca-
tive efficiency of the economy. One is that incomplete or inaccurate
disclosure about investments leads people to invest in the wrong
projects. They will spend "too much" in resources to produce
goods and services. The other is that incomplete or inaccurate dis-
closure can send the wrong signals about risk, and this distorts the
choice between investment and consumption. To see these effects,
consider three cases. In each case people invest in a firm that
promises to make widgets. They have the option of purchasing
1S The two classes of investors and the managers contract with one another through the
firm, which is a nexus of contracts. The costs of contracting are low, at least when deals are
made in advance, and we therefore expect the participants to favor the rule that maximizes
joint value. If the costs of transacting are low enough, they will produce this rule by con-
tract. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). When costs are high, the
legal system should select the rule closest to this joint-maximization outcome.
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riskless securities (such as T-Bills) and will invest in a risky ven-
ture only if the firm yields enough of an increase in productivity to
pay for the risk premium.
In the first case the manufacture of widgets is riskless. At a
cost of $1 per widget, anyone can make as many widgets as he
wants. When there is no risk in the underlying technology, a secur-
ities offense would take the form of promising to build more wid-
gets than the firm actually does. The firm might collect $10 and
build only 9 widgets. Here there is no reduction in the efficiency
with which goods are produced: the firm spends $9 to build 9 wid-
gets, and the promoters keep $1. The only injury is the creation of
uncompensated risk. People fearing that this sort of thing could
occur will demand a small amount of additional compensation for
bearing risk, and this shifts a little investment out of risky endeav-
ors. The "net harm" in a case such as this is the $1 transfer plus
the (small) increment to risk plus the costs of making, defending
against, and unmasking frauds of this sort.
In the second case the manufacture of widgets is risky, and the
promoters misrepresent the risk of the technology. Perhaps they
represent that there is no risk, when in fact there is a 50 % chance
that an investment of $10 would produce 8 widgets and a 50%
chance that it would produce 12 widgets. Once more the only in-
jury to the efficient conduct of the economy is the creation of un-
compensated risk. The "net harm" is the (small) increment to risk
plus the costs of making, defending against, and unmasking such
misrepresentations. If the costs of making accurate representations
about the risk of building widgets exceed this small sum, then this
case is an "efficient offense." Setting damages equal to the net
harm induces the promoters to incur the expense of investigation
or pay the damages, whichever is less.
In the third case the manufacture of widgets is risky, and the
promoters misrepresent the productivity of the technology. Per-
haps they represent that an investment of $10 in their new tech-
nology will on average produce 11 widgets, but in fact it will create
only a 50% chance of producing 8 widgets and a 50% chance of
producing 10 widgets. Here, too, there is uncompensated risk. This
also creates a loss of efficiency as society spends $10 to produce (on
average) only 9 widgets; had the promoters told the truth, the in-
vestors would have insisted on using the risk-free technology guar-
anteed to produce 10 widgets for $10. The "net harm" in this case
is the $1 reduction in productive efficiency plus the (small) incre-
ment to risk plus the costs of making, defending against, and un-
masking fraud. If the promoters spent less than $10 to build the
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widgets, there is also a transfer that must be extracted as part of
the net harm. Finally, this case also creates a loss in allocative effi-
ciency. The consumer who would have valued the tenth widget at
more than $1 loses the value of that widget. This is the same sort
of loss that arises in antitrust. The new elements of loss in this
third case are the hatched areas on the following graph. The
shaded triangle is the allocative loss, the reduction in consumers'
surplus; the shaded trapezoid is the reduction in productive
efficiency.
$
AC (realized)
AC (promised)
D
Q
We cannot say how often securities offenses fall into these dif-
ferent categories. Moreover, neither we nor anyone else has a good
way to determine the level of the costs involved. As a rule the cost
of increased risk is small, and for many offenses the transfer of
wealth will be far and away the largest element of the net harm.
Some multiple of the net transfer payment therefore would be a
useful starting point, with a further increase in cases that involve
identifiable reductions in allocative and productive efficiency.
D. The Role of Liquid Markets
Often it is exceptionally difficult to apply the net-harm rule.
In antitrust the net harm is the monopoly overcharge plus the allo-
cative loss from the reduction in the monopolist's output. In order
to determine either, we must first learn both the monopoly price
and the competitive price for any level of demand. This is no small
feat.19 Securities law, too, presents many problems of computation.
19 See Finkelstein & Levenbach, Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-Fixing
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Sometimes, though, prices observable in markets supply much
of the necessary information. Suppose the question is the amount
of harm inflicted by a firm's decision not to release information
about the risks of new medical imaging equipment. The technology
may not work, or it may be subject to adverse regulations, or it
may be displaced by newer technologies. Assessing and revealing
these risks may be costly and chancy, so that a strategy of saying
little may (or may not) be optimal. Ultimately something goes
wrong (maybe new regulations limit to one per city the number of
the costly machines), and the investors claim that the lack of dis-
closure was wrongful. It is possible to establish an upper limit on
the net transfer by observing the change of price of the stock when
the bad news is released.
Suppose everything happened in an instant. The firm decided
to save the costs of investigation and issued stock for a price that
reflected (undue) optimism. Moments later the bad news came out.
The price of stock would fall to the level fully informed investors
found appropriate in light of the news. The drop in price would be
what courts often call the "out-of-pocket loss"-the difference be-
tween the price paid and the price that would have been paid had
all the information that should have been released been released.
This drop in price is a ceiling on the net harm. It is a ceiling be-
cause the losses here may be offset by other investors' gains, and
because not all of the loss shows up in a reduction in society's
wealth or profits to the decisionmakers. Recall from the discussion
in Part I-C-3 that the "overpayment" for stock commonly is
greater than the net harm. Much of the overpayment will be a
transfer to people not responsible for the nondisclosure, and such
transfers are not part of the net harm. As a rule, it is safe to as-
sume that the net harm approaches but does not exceed the total
loss. 0
Things do not happen in an instant, however, so we cannot
know the exact overpayment for the stock. The problem is that
many other things happen during the time between the sale of the
Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1983, at 145; Landes & Posner, Should Indirect
Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the
Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHL L. REV. 602, 615-21 (1979); Rubinfeld & Steiner, Quantita-
tive Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 69.
20 If the costs of making, avoiding, and detecting fraud are high enough, the price
change may not actually be a ceiling, but we think this unlikely. The price change is a stake
over which people may squabble, and fighting over the stakes by making and unmasking
frauds could consume a decent share of them, but these expenses are unlikely to exceed the
stakes unless people persistently miscalculate their own self-interests.
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security and the release of the pertinent information. Events in the
economy, and the fortunes of the firm in the interim, confound ef-
forts to use price differences to find out the value of the missing
information.
The solution is a technology that permits us to "take out the
market," breaking the change in the price of a traded firm's stock
into two components. One component is the degree to which the
price changes with the market as a whole or with the industry of
which the firm is a part. The market or industry will rise or fall
with changes in the general economy, the rate of interest, foreign
trade, and alterations in demand for the industry's product. The
market-based change measures the contribution to today's price of
events beyond the firm's control, and perforce attributable to
something other than the missing information. The other compo-
nent of the price difference may be attributed to firm-specific
events. Which ones? If all of the critical information comes out at
once, then the full change in price at the time of release (after tak-
ing out the market) may be attributed with reasonable assurance
to the information. If the information leaks out in dribs and drabs,
then it is necessary to examine a longer interval, during which
other events may have intervened. The longer the interval during
which information emerges, the less precise the reading.
The technology for performing these calculations is fairly well
developed.21 It is possible to measure the historic relation between
changes in the price of a firm's stock and changes in some larger
basket of stocks (whether the market as a whole, an industry
group, or some weighted mix). This relation takes the form ri = ai
+ l3Rm + -yR + E, where r, is the total change in the price of a
firm's stock, a is a firm-specific constant, #3Rm is the market-firm
relation (p3) times the market's movement in the interval (Rm), -YR.
is the industry-firm relation (-y) times the industry group's move-
ment in the interval (R,), and e, the "residual," is the unexplained
portion of the change in price. This is the portion we attribute to
firm-specific information. With this relation in hand, and knowing
how the market or other reference group behaved during a particu-
lar interval, we may determine the expected change in price of the
-1 For reasonably accessible discussions, see Brown & Warner, Measuring Security
Price Performance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1980); Brown & Warner, Using Daily Stock Re-
turns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. FIN. EcoN. 1 (1985); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance
Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1
(1982); Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J.L. & EcoN.
121 (1981); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory, and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977).
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firm's stock if nothing peculiar to the firm took place. If the firm's
stock does not behave according to the prediction, we chalk up the
difference to some firm-specific news. The shorter the interval over
which the calculation is performed, the greater our ability to match
particular pieces of news with the effects attributable to them.
This method obviously is not a perfect substitute for the ideal
"instantaneous" price change. There are intervening events that
may be hard to disentangle. Sometimes the event window (the pe-
riod during which the information comes out) is uncomfortably
large. The method works much better for actively traded securities
than for thinly traded stocks; it does not work at all for stock in
closely held firms. The method assumes a particular form of rela-
tion between the market and individual stocks that is necessarily
an oversimplification. It leaves out some influences, and it will per-
form badly if there is a sudden change in f# or -y, the coefficients
relating this stock to others, during the interval in question.2 2 And
even an "instantaneous" price change would not tell us one very
important fact: whether managers knew or could have known the
firm-specific information in order to disclose it at any particular
time.
Economists have taken to this method more readily than law-
yers and courts. One sometimes hears the objection that this
method assumes that the market is "efficient" in the sense that
"the price always accurately represents the real value of the secur-
ity," while the person raising the objection knows that the price is
not always right. The objection misses the point, because the
method does not assume or depend on a belief that the price is
always right. The method rests on three more modest beliefs: (1)
that prices change quickly in response to new information; (2) that
the quick change is "unbiased" (that is, it does not systematically
overshoot or undershoot the change that ultimately will be deemed
merited on the basis of more leisurely contemplation of the new
information); and (3) that the degree to which the price reflects the
underlying economic reality does not change substantially during
short periods. The method "works," for example, if prices always
reflect only fifty percent of a given firm's "true" value; any change
in the price will give an accurate representation of the marginal
2 The technical problems are well understood in the economic literature, and some of
the legal literature is also attentive. See, e.g., Note, Rule 10b-5 Damage Computation: Ap-
plication of Financial Theory to Determine Net Economic Loss, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 838
(1983) (a sophisticated study marred by misspecification of the objective of the process of
computing damages).
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more slowly than they, this also reflects bad news. It is therefore
quite sensible to say that a plaintiff may allege that nondisclosure
harmed investors because the stock did not rise fast enough; we
return to this in Part II. The existence of liquid markets for many
stocks has other consequences to which we also turn below. These
consequences include the possibility of "cover" to stop the ac-
cumulation of damages and the elimination of "bargains" (and
hence benefit-of-bargain damages).
II. THE LEGAL RULEs AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
We are now in a position to put the economics of sanctions
together with the law of securities. We start by discussing why
some remedies are rarely used in securities cases. We look at the
difference between sanctions that start from the plaintiff's "loss"
and those that start from the defendant's "profit." Then we ex-
amine fraud in the issuance of stock, fraud and omissions in the
aftermarket, insider trading, and deceit by brokers.
A. The Missing Remedies
Although courts apply a welter of remedies in securities cases,
some of the remedies commonly used in other parts of the law are
missing. With exceptions so rare as to be practically unimportant,
courts do not award benefit-of-bargain damages, consequential
damages, or punitive damages in securities cases. We think that
these omissions from the arsenal fit the theory of optimal sanc-
tions.
1. Benefit-of-Bargain Damages. Suppose a firm offers securi-
ties to the public for $30 per share, representing that they are
"worth" $40 in light of the nature and prospects of the business.
Someone buys the stock in reliance on that representation. Or sup-
pose a firm announces, while its stock is trading for $30, that it has
concluded that the stock is "undervalued" by the market and is
"worth" at least $40 per share. Again someone buys stock in reli-
ance on the representation. A while later, each investor finds that
the stock is trading .for only $30, that the supposed elements of
extra value are not worth very much (or never existed), and brings
suit. Unless the investor can show that the stock was worth less
than $30 on the day of the purchase, he will lose. Even if he wins,
the investor will get only the difference between the $30 purchase
price and the "value" of the stock on the day of the purchase.26
28 Compare Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.) (no bene-
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value of the new information, so long as this relation stays con-
stant. The data collected by economists over the last twenty years
quite strongly support these three modest claims, the only ones es-
sential to the method. 3
At all events, there is no obstacle to using this method even if
it relies on the assumption that the price accurately reflects all
public information. This is, after all, the fundamental assumption
of securities law. The Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) stand for the pro-
position that disclosure of information is the basis of an efficient
securities market and that whatever price the traffic will bear once
the information is out is "right." Recall that we have introduced
this method of getting information from the market in order to
approximate the ideal, instantaneous measure of price change-
which itself embodies the principle that "the price is right."
This assumption of securities law now has the support of a
great deal of theory and evidence. The theory is straightforward. If
the price of a stock at any given time is not "right" in relation to
the price the stock will have once people wise up, then arbitrageurs
can make a lot of money by buying "undervalued" stocks, selling
"overvalued" ones, spreading the news, and selling once the price
gets to the appropriate level. The more astute the arbitrageurs and
other market professionals, and the more quickly they can move
capital into and out of particular holdings, the faster this process
will occur.2 4 The process eventually makes it difficult even for pro-
fessional traders to make money, unless they are the first to obtain
and act on information. A great deal of data, including evidence
that most professional traders are unable to "beat the market,"
supports the proposition that prices quickly and accurately reflect
the public information about the firms.25
We therefore think it appropriate to use the market method to
pare away extraneous events and effects. The "residual" in the
market model is a reasonable reflection of the effects of the firm-
specific information. If the firm's stock sinks faster than other sim-
ilarly volatile firms in the market, this reflects bad news; if it rises
23 See, e.g., RICHARD BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON
STOCKS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1983); J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET, THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE ch. 4 (1973).
214 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 569-72.
25 See R. BREALEY, supra note 23, ch. 3; J. CRAGG & B. MALIKL, EXPECTATIONS AND THE
STRUCTURE OF SHARE PRICES (1982); J. LORm & M. HAMILTON, supra note 23, ch. 4; Pearce &
Roley, Stock Prices and Economic News, 58 J. Bus. 49 (1985) (effect across the market
occurs within the day the news is released).
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Why do courts not award investors the benefit of the bargain they
suppose they are getting?
The principal answer is that there are no "bargains" in liquid
securities markets. People continually search for "bargains," but
the process of search ensures that bargains quickly vanish as prices
adjust. If stock is trading for $30 when the firm's management be-
lieves it should trade for $40, the most likely explanation is that
sophisticated investors think the managers unduly optimistic.
Things are not quite so easy when the stock is the initial issue of a
new firm. Here, however, there is a different reason to think that
the price is not a "bargain." The promoters of a firm have no par-
ticular reason to give stock away for less than it is worth. An inves-
tor is not deeply harmed when he learns that the sellers' claim to
be giving things away for a song is not true.17 The buyer suffers no
lost opportunity. Had he invested in another firm, he would not
have had a bargain there either.
There is another definition of a bargain: the existence of con-
sumers' surplus. If Perkins values a particular house at $50,000 be-
cause it is uniquely suited to his tastes, and no one else would pay
more than $40,000 for the house, Perkins can purchase it for
$40,001 and enjoy a "bargain" of $9999. Benefit-of-bargain dam-
ages in contract cases often are designed to compensate people for
a loss of consumers' surplus. A breach of contract that prevents
Perkins from occupying this house destroys the consumers' sur-
plus, which is a real economic loss. But there is no similar consum-
ers' surplus in securities markets. Money is fungible even if partic-
ular securities are not. The price an investor is willing to pay for
securities in one firm depends on the rate of return available from
some other investment. Professional investors move funds from
one security to another until, at the margin, each produces the
fit-of-bargain damages in securities cases), with Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981)
(damages available to ensure that a seller of securities gets the consideration for which he
contracted).
2' A number of studies suggest that the securities of firms just going public are "bar-
gains" in the sense that they appreciate faster than their apparent risk category implies.
Economists have asked whether the investment bankers of these firms are taking advantage
of their clients to funnel gains to favored customers. It may be, though, that the apparent
"bargain" is nothing other than a substitute for additional expenses on investigating and
promoting the firm; it is a trade of (undisclosed) risk for extra expected return, and hence
no special bargain. We need not resolve the characterization of this new-issue discount, how-
ever. It is no more than a few percent on average, and no one believes that investors are
entitled to this kind of bargain under the securities laws. The absence of a new-issue dis-
count cannot be traced to any "wrongful" behavior, and hence it is not a problem in the
design of optimal sanctions.
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same anticipated return (adjusted for risk). The activities of these
professionals set the price everyone receives. Because one share of
a given firm's stock is the same as another, the marginal return
from a stock is the same as the average return. This implies that
every share of stock is a marginal one, and there can be no capital-
market equivalent of consumers' surplus in other markets.28
There may be consumers' surplus in close corporations, how-
ever. The holder of stock in such a corporation often does not want
to diversify fully, so that marginal and average values may differ.
The absence of a liquid market means that the price of stock may
not reflect all information. Sometimes the price at which stock in a
closely held firm is offered is designed to create a surplus; perhaps
the stock is meant as a "bargain" in order to apportion returns
among investors unequally. (Other investors may take their returns
through higher salaries or perquisites in their roles as managers.)
Thus it may be appropriate to use a benefit-of-bargain measure to
implement the contractual arrangement designed for a particular
close corporation. As it turns out, this is the only time such dam-
ages are awarded in securities cases.
2. Consequential Damages. In contract cases courts some-
times award consequential damages. Perkins contracts to sell a
specialized machine to Smith. Smith plans to use the machine on
an assembly line producing widgets. Perkins defaults, and Smith's
assembly line lies idle for months while Smith obtains a replace-
ment. Smith commonly can recover consequential damages such as
the profits lost during the idling of the plant. These are parts of
the "net harm" from the breach, because they represent the pro-
ductive value of the equipment that was forced to remain idle.29 In
tort law consequential damages are the norm. Those who suffer
business losses may recover profits lost in consequence.30
28 One small qualification. Some stocks may have special value in diversifying a portfo-
lio. There are also transaction costs in trading stock that decline with the size of the trade.
An investor thus will not be indifferent between 1000 shares of one firm and one share each
of 1000 firms. These are not large effects, however, and it is therefore safe to compute dam-
ages on the assumption that there is no surplus value from inframarginal shares.
29 The award of consequential damages in such cases is not automatic. It depends on
the seller's knowledge of the purpose of the machine, so that the seller may take any cost-
justified precautions. Even so, liability depends on an express or implicit undertaking to pay
consequential damages, and trade customs may exclude consequential damages. See, e.g.,
Western Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Perloff,
Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 39 (1981). The qualifications are not important for current purposes.
30 There are interesting disputes about whether physical injury or other conditions are
essential to such recoveries, but we need not pursue them here. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste
v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (physical damage required). Corn-
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In securities law, by contrast, there are no consequential dam-
ages. If Perkins claims that a decline in the price of stock (attribu-
table to Smith's fraud) caused Perkins to miss out on some other
profitable opportunity, Perkins will collect only guffaws for his
trouble. The theory of optimal sanctions requires that Perkins lose,
because changes in the price of securities do not themselves create
economic injury. Unlike the missing machine, which can leave a
plant useless, a change in prices does not affect the employment of
real assets.
If Perkins owns a plant that needs a machine, he could sell
securities to obtain the price for that machine. He may claim that
the decline in price prevented him from raising needed funds. But
if Perkins's plant produces goods worth the cost of keeping the
plant in operation, Perkins also can borrow the funds needed to
pay for the machine. There is no link between the use to which
funds are put (here, buying a machine) and the source of those
funds. A claim of consequential damages in securities litigation al-
most always supposes that there is some link between sources and
uses of funds, and such claims properly fail.
3. Punitive Damages. Punitive damages are unavailable in
securities law.3 1 This is puzzling at first glance because punitive
damages, which give the plaintiff more than his actual loss, are one
way of increasing the damages when required by the formula for
optimal sanctions. The rule "net harm divided by the probability
of successful prosecution" implies a multiplier, because prosecu-
tion is never certain. Most securities offenses are concealable.
Fraud is concealment; omissions may not come to light; fraud and
omissions that do not produce actual loss (or just temper the rate
of gain) are not apt to be prosecuted.
The absence of punitive damages is anomalous. It may be de-
fensible, though. We show below that many measures of dam-
ages-especially rescission and awards based on the plaintiff's out-
of-pocket loss-have multipliers built in. Because these awards ex-
ceed the net harm, often by substantial amounts, it is inappropri-
ate to make further adjustments through punitive damages. The
pare Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OxFOrD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982), with Rizzo, A The-
ory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982).
31 See, e.g., Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313 (2d Cir.
1977); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 781 (3d Cir. 1976). A rough
equivalent of punitive damages may be available under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), when the terms of that stat-
ute allow trebling, see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3292 (1985), but we disre-
gard RICO in this article.
1985]
The University of Chicago Law Review
absence of punitive damages is no more than a second-best solu-
tion; it would be preferable to establish optimal damages for trad-
ing in the aftermarket and then allow a multiplier to take account
of concealment.
B. The Choice Between Plaintiff's Loss and Defendant's Gain
"Injury" and "restitution" are the competing paradigms of
damages in securities law. The "injury" measure, often called "out-
of-pocket damages," looks to the plaintiff's loss. The court asks
whether the investor got a security that was "worth" what he paid
(or got what the security was worth, if he was a seller). If not, the
defendant must make up the difference. There are quite a few
ways to produce a damages remedy based on injury (including re-
scission, which forces the defendant to bear the entire risk of the
transaction), but the difference is not important for current pur-
poses. The restitution measure, by contrast, looks at the profit the
defendant obtained from the transaction. The court requires the
defendant to disgorge the profit, which may be greater or less than
the other party's loss.
Courts seem to have great difficulty deciding when to set dam-
ages based on injury and when to set damages based on restitu-
tion.3 2 They wander back and forth with little explanation, and
there is even authority for the rule that damages should be set as
either plaintiff's loss or defendant's gain, whichever is larger.3 3
As an economic matter, much of the dispute is of little mo-
ment. Losses and benefits often match one another. If A deceives B
about the value of stock and so induces B to pay too much for the
stock, B's loss will equal A's profit. If the promoters of a corpora-
tion (or the general partner of a limited partnership) tell fibs and
so collect too much for the investment interests they sell, loss
again equals profit. And profit is a pretty good starting point in the
theory of optimal sanctions. The offender's profit is usually a
transfer from the victim and thus part of the net harm, often the
largest part of the net harm.
Profit-based remedies run into difficulty, though, because a
simple rule requiring the offender to pay all his profit from the
transaction would make the economic gains from the transaction
part of the sanction. If the firm's promoter saved resources by not
32 See Thompson, supra note 3.
33 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); Siebel v. Scott,
725 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3515 (1984).
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investigating some contingency, a rule that counted these savings
as part of the "profit" would fail. The damages rule would no
longer induce the promoter to compare the savings from reducing
the scope of inquiry against the harms imposed on other people. It
is therefore necessary to exclude from the definition of "profit" any
savings that result from the transaction in question or other pro-
ductive efforts of the defendant. This is indeed the legal rule.34 If
the filtering is done imperfectly (as it will be), this should not be
cause for great concern, because profit-based remedies themselves
are too low when detection and prosecution are not certain.
The hard question is why we should ever see loss-based reme-
dies. Although some multiple of the defendant's gain is apt to be a
good proxy for the net harm of a violation, the investor's loss in
some kinds of cases could be wildly off the mark. Consider a case
in which a manager of a firm recklessly announces that the firm
has made a fabulous invention that will be worth billions. The
price of the firm's stock soars. Two days later the manager sheep-
ishly announces that it was all a false alarm, and the price returns
to the original level. Everyone who bought stock during these two
days suffers a substantial loss; neither the manager nor the firm
gets any gain. Those who violated the rule get no profit. There is,
of course, a match between profit and loss; the buyers' loss is ex-
actly offset by gains realized by those who sold stock during the
two days. These gainers have not violated any rule, however, and
cannot plausibly be called on to pay their gains to the losers. A
rule that required the firm to compensate the buyers for their full
loss would impose damages far in excess of the net harm. Cases
such as this one have some net harm-such episodes lead investors
to do some investigating on their own, and they increase by a little
the amount of uncompensated risk in the economy-but the harm
is small. We therefore should expect to see a variety of devices by
which even damages that are stated as loss-based are converted
into recoveries tied to defendants' gains. We return to these limit-
ing devices in Part II-D; we concentrate first on the most promi-
nent of the subjects for which loss-based measures are used-the
fraudulent issuance of stock.
31 See Seibel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3515
(1984); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 787 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
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C. Fraud in the Issuance of Securities
The doctrines that apply to fraud in the issuance of securities
can produce quite spectacular recoveries. If securities are not prop-
erly registered, or the selling documents contain lies or material
omissions, the ordinary remedy under section 12 of the 1933 Act is
the purchase price less the value of the security at the time of trial
or sale.35 This "rescissionary" remedy not only compensates the in-
vestor for out-of-pocket loss but also may compensate the investor
for an intervening drop in the market. It throws onto the defen-
dant the entire risk of the market while the investor holds the se-
curity. If the firm fails or the market declines, the investor may
recover; if the firm succeeds or the market rises, the investor will
keep the security and the profit. It is a no-lose situation.
If the problem lies in the registration document rather than
the selling documents-or if the investor seeks a remedy from
someone other than the issuer or seller-the rule is a modification
of rescission. Under section 11(e) of the 1933 Act any defendant
may claim that the decline in the value of securities was caused by
something other than the fraud or omission;36 this permits use of
the market model to correct the award, to filter out changes in the
market as a whole. 7 No underwriter may be held liable for more
than the amount it received; this liability is divided among mem-
bers of the underwriting syndicate.
What accounts for the severity of these rules and for the fact
that the sellers, which are liable under section 12, face higher pen-
alties than other participants, such as accountants and law firms
that are liable only under section 11? To a substantial extent the
rules rest on the distinction between unconditional and conditional
deterrence. There is no good reason for not registering stock re-
quired to be registered or for telling lies in the issuance of stock.
By throwing all the risk on the defendants under section 12, the
statute channels activity toward more appropriate routes.
The circumstances are ripe for unconditional deterrence in the
issuance of stock. The SEC has an administrative process offering
" 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). We assume for purposes of analysis in the text that section 12
allows investors to be compensated for a decline in the overall market. This issue, however,
has never been definitively resolved. Arguments could be made on both sides.
36 Id. § 77k(e). We do not say that rescission is mandatory. The availability of devices
to moderate this remedy remains to be resolved. But rescission is at least the presumptive
rule.
,, See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586-88 (E.D.N.Y.
1971). But see Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 407-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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guidance to issuers before stock is sold, and a firm believing that it
is appropriate to withhold certain information (or not to register
the security) can ascertain whether its view is correct. The alloca-
tive efficiency loss from fraud or omission is greatest in the process
of issuing stock-this is where resources may be diverted into busi-
nesses that are less efficient than the best available production
process, which creates real loss. It is exceptionally difficult to mea-
sure this loss, which again suggests the utility of a rule that throws
on the defendant the burden of uncertainty.
There are no third-party gainers in the issuance of securities.
The net harm is therefore likely to be the gross harm, unlike the
situation of the aftermarket, to which we turn below. There is also
a substantial congruence between loss and profit. Suppose the pro-
moters of a firm represent that they have put $1000 in inventory
into the firm, when in fact they have put in only $200. They sell
the stock for $1000. The investors' loss of $800 exactly matches the
promoters' gain. We have discussed above the reason for thinking
it a good idea to start with a gain-based measure of net loss, and
the statutory remedy apparently does this.
There are two potential objections to this line of analysis.
First, suits often are brought against the underwriters rather than
the promoters, and the underwriters do not get the profits; second,
the statute permits the recovery of $1000 in the event the market
falls, not just the $800 the promoters extract as profit. The obser-
vation that defendants may be people other than the promoters is
accurate, but it is not terribly important. The defendants will be in
privity with the promoters and can arrange for indemnification, re-
quire the promoters to post a bond, or take the precautions neces-
sary to ensure that they will not be liable. The potential defen-
dants can apportion duties and liabilities to achieve compliance at
the least total cost; this is yet another implication of the Coase
Theorem. The observation that the recovery can exceed the profit
is true only in part-many of the players, such as the accountants
and law firms, can be liable only under section 11, which allows an
adjustment for changes in the market. More to the point, even
those who must stand by to compensate investors for a drop in the
market can hedge against that risk. An underwriter that sells a
new issue of stock can deal with the risk of a falling market by
selling a market-index future short. The promoter, too, can hedge
against the risk of a falling market and a consequent increase in
his exposure. The existence of liquid public markets makes this
hedging possible, so that ultimately there is not much (systematic)
difference between the section 11 rescission remedy, which allows
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an adjustment for the market, and the section 12 rescission rem-
edy, which apparently does not.
It is nonetheless interesting that section 11(b) gives the is-
suer's assistants (such as accountants) defenses unavailable to the
issuer. 8 This difference will be reflected in the terms of trade on
which these specialists offer their services. Courts have been recep-
tive to arguments through which these specialists substantially re-
duce their exposure in cases of material omissions (as opposed to
fraud). Here the argument for unconditional deterrence is at its
weakest. There may be benefits in reduced investigation and pre-
sentation of information. Accountants and other specialists per-
form valuable services, and a rule that imposed the equivalent of
no-fault liability on these specialists would simply reduce the
amount of specialists' services offered at the time a firm issues se-
curities. Thus the courts' creativity in reducing the awards against
these specialists. One court found the use of a rescission standard
in a suit against accountants "unjust insofar as it compensates an
investor for the nonspecific risks which he assumes by entering the
market" and therefore ordered a reduction in the award to take
account of changes in the market.3 9 Another court held that an ac-
countant may not be required to compensate investors for any ele-
ment of loss attributable to business problems of the issuer (as op-
posed to the actual consequences of the misstatements). ° Adjust-
ments such as these, ad hoc from one perspective, make more
sense from the perspective of the economics of sanctions.
We have so far treated the issuance of securities as if the firms
were either closely held or going public. In such cases there is a
close match between the profit received by the promoter and any
excessive payment extracted from the investors. What of public
corporations that issue new stock? Here the match breaks down.
The "beneficiaries" of any wrongdoing will be the prior investors in
the firm. These investors may sell their stock after the new issue
hits the market, and they will realize the gains from any falsifica-
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1982).
39 Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations
omitted), rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
4o Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982). The accountant misrepresented the tax consequences of investment in an
oil exploration venture. 649 F.2d at 178-79. After many wells came up dry, the investors
sued. The district court ordered the accountants to pay the investors the difference between
the price of the securities and their "value" as of the date of investment, considering both
(a) the adverse tax consequences, and (b) the fact that the wells were known, ex post, to be
dry. Id. at 189-90. The court of appeals held that only element (a) was part of the damages.
Id. at 190-91.
[52:611
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases
tion. When the issuer pays damages in a suit by the new investors,
much of the compensation will come from other new inves-
tors-those who bought the first series of stock while its price was
inflated by the misrepresentations made to the second wave of in-
vestors. The investors who bought the first series of securities in
the aftermarket lose twice-their stock falls (just like that of the
purchasers of the second series of securities) when the truth comes
out, and it falls further because the firm must pay out assets pref-
erentially to the purchasers of the second series.
This brings us back to the nagging problem of matched gains
and losses. Some investors gain, others lose, and the gains and
losses are approximately equal. The "net harm" may be small. In a
case such as this, it is only the reduction in allocative efficiency
caused by an increase in risk, the reduction in productive efficiency
if the new sales are used to install an inferior productive technol-
ogy, and the usual costs of making, defending against, and prose-
cuting fraud. It also turns out, however, that the real damages
awarded in cases of sales by public corporations are small. The
purchasers of the first issue in the aftermarket could bring their
own suit against the issuer because (by hypothesis) the issuer's
misdeeds inflated the price they paid just as it inflated the price
the purchasers of the new issue paid. If the issuer pays damages to
almost all its investors at once, it is the next best thing to paying
very little in damages; it becomes the equivalent of a dividend or
partial liquidation. (If the defendant in these cases is an account-
ant or other specialist rather than the issuer, then the problem is
fundamentally the same as with the firm going public. Damages
computed with all market movements filtered out will give these
specialists incentives to take the appropriate degree of precau-
tions.)
D. Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Aftermarkets
When the offense in question concerns only trading in the
aftermarket, it is impossible to get away from the problem of
matched gains and losses. Recall the example in Part II-B of the
manager who announces good news for the firm and two days later
takes it all back. Here the investors who sold during the two days
gained; those who bought during the two days lost what the sellers
gained; those who neither bought nor sold were unaffected; and
there was almost no net harm. Because the sellers are no longer
investors in this firm, and because there are bystander-investors, a
payment of damages by the firm would not be a wash. Damages
computed on the basis of the loss of the investors who purchased
19851
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in the two days would greatly exceed the optimal sanction.
We cannot justify this by saying, as we did above, that the
excessive remedy promotes desirable unconditional deterrence. A
firm issuing securities can delay while investigating or it can be
pessimistic with safety. A damages rule that "unconditionally" de-
ters certain conduct is not likely to cut off valuable opportunities
for very long. But a firm that discloses information in the after-
market as it goes along inevitably takes the risk of excessive opti-
mism and excessive pessimism. A rule that penalizes excesses in
either direction would lead to quiet, not (necessarily) to an in-
crease in the world's portion of truth. Investors would not want a
rule that promoted silence whenever possible. If the firm is reti-
cent, then other actors (investment bankers and advisers, brokers,
and so on) will produce information. They have more difficulty get-
ting access to the information, so this news will be more expensive
and less accurate than that produced by the firm itself. It is there-
fore essential to have a rule that induces the firm to balance the
costs of producing more (or more accurate) news against the net
harms inflicted by error.
It is not possible to escape from this difficult problem by fixing
the liability on the managers rather than "the firm." The firm is
nothing but a complex set of contracts, and liability that is as-
signed to one actor will not stay there. It can be moved by con-
tract. If the law prevents its movement (say, by prohibiting indem-
nification of managers), it will produce a change in relative prices.
Managers will demand higher salaries in light of their increased
risks, and they can use the new income to purchase insurance. The
trick is to set the optimal level of damages, so that those who then
transact against the background of the damages rule will be led to
take the right amount of care.
There is another reason to be skeptical of proposals that
fasten liability on managers for harms they inflict on the securities
market. One common justification of damages rules is that they
move losses to those best able to spread risks."1 Moving risks to
those who are less risk averse (or more able to transfer the risk to a
risk-neutral insurer) produces real economic gains. The structure
of securities markets suggests, though, that differences in degrees
of risk aversion do not support damages awards against managers.
The public corporation as an institution is designed to move risk
away from managers and toward investors. The equity investors
41 GuIDo CALABREsI, THE CosTS OF AcciDENTS ch. 4 (1970); Polinsky, Risk Sharing
through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983).
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are purchasing risk; in exchange they obtain the residual returns of
the venture. They have a comparative advantage as risk bearers
because they can hold stock in many different firms at once. Diver-
sified investors act substantially as if risk neutral. Well they
should. An investor with a diversified portfolio will be the hidden
gainer in a transaction like the example above as often as he will
be a loser. Every losing buyer during the two-day period is
matched with a gaining seller. Over the long run, any reasonably
diversified investor will be a buyer half the time and a seller half
the time. Such an investor perceives little good in a legal rule that
forces his winning self to compensate his losing self over and over.
A manager, on the other hand, is undiversified and acts as if
risk averse. Much of his human capital and a substantial portion of
his wealth are tied up in a single firm. This lack of diversification
induces the manager to work in the investors' interests; it ties his
fortunes to those of the firm. It also makes the manager a singu-
larly poor person for the bearing of additional risk. The more of
the inevitable risks of the venture the manager bears personally,
the more cautiously he behaves. Yet the effectively risk-neutral in-
vestors do not want overcautious managers.42
This is not to say that the optimal damages in aftermarket
cases are zero just because most gains and losses net out. There
will be the usual net harms of the costs of guarding against and
litigating about the wrong, and there will be an allocative efficiency
loss if transactions of a particular sort create uncompensated risk.
The larger the transfer among investors, the more they will spend
guarding against the problem. Even a diversified investor would
like to be on the winning side of every transaction. The very large
size of the securities-information industry suggests that the costs
of guarding against transfers are not small. The availability of
compensation will lead to a reduction in these expenditures. But
the optimal award is surely a good deal smaller than the gross
42 This is not to say that managers should never be held liable. Sometimes, especially
when a firm is thinly capitalized in relation to the maximum risk a manager's acts can cre-
ate, it is appropriate to impose personal liability in order to induce the manager to secure
insurance. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs'of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857, 868-76 (1984). Securities cases involving transactions in the aftermarket do
not fall into this category because they affect only the wealth of the investors.
Insurance firms may decline to write (or business firms to purchase) insurance against
certain types of misconduct by managers. Fraud is often uninsured or uninsurable. There is
a moral hazard. If managers could shift the risk of liability for fraud to someone else, they
would commit more frauds. The justification for awarding damages personally in case of
fraud is that such awards do not create "too much caution," and failing to hold managers
liable may create a moral hazard.
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transfer of wealth. There should be a presumption in favor of net-
ting out gains before computing the award.43 That translates to a
rule of the wrongdoer's profits, plus some measure of the costs of
carrying out and thwarting these affairs and a measure of the costs
of risk."
The question remains whether courts use a profit-based ap-
proach. Certainly so in cases involving close corporations. There
the wrongdoer's profits almost always equal the other investors'
losses, so that profit and loss measures collapse. Things are less
clear for publicly traded corporations. For many years courts ar-
ticulated a rule under which all investors who traded while the
price of stock was affected by the firm's misstatements were enti-
tled to the difference between the price they paid (or got) and the
"true value" of the stock. That loss-based measure remains a ver-
bal point of departure in the cases. Yet recent cases also express
dissatisfaction with this measure.
For example, a firm gave some material and adverse corporate
information to outsiders, who traded before the firm released the
information generally. (This is nominally an insider-trading case,
the subject of the next section. But because it was brought against
the firm, and the gravamen of the claim was that the firm permit-
ted its other investors to trade while inadequately informed, we
treat it as a case of ordinary material omission in the aftermarket.)
Those who bought in the market between the privileged release of
information and the ultimate release sought to recover their losses
from the firm. The district court used the loss-based measure of
damages, but the Second Circuit reversed.45 It ordered a remedy
based on the profits the traders realized by getting out before the
market dropped. The court worried that a full recovery of losses
would be excessive (though on unarticulated grounds), and it also
"s In antitrust law, similar considerations lead courts to disregard the monopoly profits
garnered by "fringe" firms that raise prices to match those of a cartel. See Mid-West Paper
Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 580-87 (3d Cir. 1979); Landes, supra
note 7, at 666-68. Although this profit and the associated allocative-efficiency loss is part of
the net harm of the cartel as consumers see things, the wrongdoers perceive the fringe firms'
profits as a loss aufomatically. They are "benefits of the cartel" that are transferred from
the cartelists to the fringe, and so there is no need to tax them away again via a damages
remedy. So, too, with benefits transferred automatically from one group of investors to an-
other-benefits never enjoyed by securities offenders.
44 The best rule might be a mechanical one-say, one percent of the gross movement in
the price of the firm's stock attributable to the wrong. This avoids the need to compute the
real, and utterly unquantifiable, loss. Such a mechanical rule could be established only by
statute, though, and we do not consider it further.
41 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
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doubted that there was a causal connection between the withhold-
ing and the losses. People would have traded (and some would
have suffered loss) no matter whether some investors got tips, and
the truth would have led to loss anyway. This is just another way
of stating the point that gains and losses net out when the revela-
tion of the truth is delayed.
It is difficult to know whether such profit-based measures are
displacing loss-based measures because there are so few cases in-
volving violations by firms in relation to trading in the
aftermarket. Cases arising out of such circumstances are routinely
settled before trial, sometimes for nuisance value and sometimes
for substantial sums, but always without resolution of the question
whether the court would have used loss or profit as the starting
point for computing damages.
Litigators usually assume that the courts will continue to use
loss-based measures. There continue to be examples of this rem-
edy. In one recent case investors sued the firm for disseminating
annual reports that were "too favorable."48 Investors who bought
during the three years affected by the reports claimed that they
paid too much for the stock, and they recovered the difference be-
tween what they paid and the "true" value of the stock at the time
of each purchase. The court used a market adjustment to set a cap
on the amount of loss. Observing that when the truth came out,
the price of the stock fell eleven percent, the court used that as the
presumptive measure of recovery. The use of price data from the
market at least gives an accurate picture of loss; the use of market
movements to subtract out market effects, leaving only firm-spe-
cific effects, is better still. But it is nonetheless an inappropriate
starting point.
Maybe it is possible to justify loss-based remedies on a combi-
nation of grounds. First, they redress people's incentives to take
46 Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838,
and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982).
47 673 F.2d at 577. It reversed a valuation by the jury, which concluded that the stock
was overpriced by 52% before the truth was revealed. The court did not use the complete
model, though, because it did not account for the movement of the market during the period
Solitron fell by 11%. (Apparently no one asked it to.) The court also used the jury's valua-
tions for earlier years, concluding that the ultimate price adjustment did not reveal how the
overstatements had affected price in the early years. Id. The court's distinction was roughly
accurate. Doubtless information reached the market no matter what the annual reports said.
As a result the extent to which a firm's misstatements could keep the price artificially high
would decline steadily as information leaked out. The first purchasers' overpayments would
exceed the overpayments of the last purchasers-who, as the court observed, could not have
lost more than the 11% adjustment.
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too much precaution, an incentive they would have if private losses
were not compensable. Second, they serve as very rough multipli-
ers of the real "net harm," increasing the anticipated penalty to
take account of the fact that most wrongful omissions (and even
most falsehoods) are not caught and prosecuted. Third, over the
run of cases the "excess" of a loss-based measure is reduced by the
fact that courts do'not award damages for failure of people to gain.
Suppose a material omission by a firm holds the price of that
firm's stock constant while the market (or industry group) is rising.
In our terminology, this is a real loss to investors; the failure to rise
is no different from an actual decline.48 Yet few investors litigate in
such cases, and we have not found an award of damages based on a
claim that the firm's misconduct caused the investors not to par-
ticipate in a profitable advance. We have not found a use of the
market model to increase damages in any fashion, although as a
logical matter it should have this effect frequently.
All of these are excuses rather than explanations, however. A
fourth ground may be more substantial. The private damages ac-
tion based on Rule 10b-5 has a "scienter" requirement.49 Wilful (or
maybe reckless) misconduct is a condition of liability; negligence is
insufficient. The wilfulness requirement is designed to filter out
many cases in which there was wrongful conduct, but the plaintiff
cannot adequately establish state of mind. The more cases are
filtered out, the more appropriate it is to use a multiplier in the
remaining cases of liability. If liability is confined to truly egre-
gious acts, we no longer have as much worry about optimal deter-
rence. The interaction of the scienter requirement with the dam-
ages rule should get rid of excessive (or, what is the same thing,
inaccurate) enforcement. 5° With employment of the substantive
rules to handle marginal cases, it is more appropriate to move in
the direction of unconditional deterrence for the rest. If the scien-
ter rule does not filter out dubious cases, on the other hand-if it
turns out always to be possible to find some culpable omission
when things go bad51 -then loss-based damages are far too high,
and it is necessary to put a more modest remedy in their place.
48 See supra pp. 625-30; see also Note, supra note 22, at 844.
4, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
10 On the relation between inaccurate enforcement and damages rules, see Polinsky &
Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic
Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REv. 447 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 678-79.
5' As Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985), suggests.
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E. Insiders' Trading
Insiders' trading is usually characterized as a form of miscon-
duct in the aftermarket. The firm delays release of information,
while insiders or tippees trade in advance of the price change that
will occur when the news comes out. If the principal complaint is
delay in the release of material information, then the analysis of
the preceding section applies. Most delays are not actionable at all,
and for actionable delays gains and losses should be offset. If the
principal complaint is the trading rather than the fact of delay, it
is necessary to look farther.
Suppose the parties agree that the firm released all necessary
information to the public on schedule, and the only complaint is
that some people traded before the release. It is hard to identify
any harm in such a case. The insider's trading partners are not
injured by the transaction; they were buying (or selling) anyway,
and the insider's trading activity did not induce others to trade.5 2
In liquid markets, the insider's orders are matched against other
preexisting orders. Even if the insider's activity had an effect on
the price of the stock, that would not induce others to trade. A
stock does not become less appropriate as part of an investor's
portfolio just because its price moves a little.5 3 The effect of the
insider's activity therefore appears to be the same as the effect of
the firm's decision to withhold release of the information.
This is not quite right, however. The insider's activities may
lead the price to move in the direction implied by the undisclosed
information, making the price a better indicator of value. The in-
sider's trading also may compensate the insider for producing the
information, which may be of value to the firm. For these and
other reasons insiders' trading may be valuable to investors, in
which event it should not be penalized at all." On the other hand,
the opportunity to trade may induce managers to take inappropri-
ate risks (in order to increase the volatility of the stock's price) or
to delay the release of information, and the lure of trading may
lead insiders to release the news (if only by accident) or permit
", In some cases involving close corporations the insider may stir up the trade by mak-
ing false or misleading representations to the other investors. Here it is possible to identify
an injured party, and long before Rule 10b-5 the "special circumstances doctrine" required
the insider to surrender his gains. Cf. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
53 A movement in price might attract close followers of a firm because the new price
appears to be inappropriate in light of all the public information about the firm. But these
professional investors could as easily decide to investigate or wait as to buy or sell.
'4See HENRY MANNE, INSDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton & Fis-
chel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
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others to infer the news at a time when the firm's best interest lies
in secrecy. 55 In that event the trading creates net harms-not
losses incurred by investors trading in the market while the secret
is still secret, but losses perceived by all investors in the firm. Each
finds that stock sells for a little less because of the increased vola-
tility (a form of risk) and because of the chance that insiders'will
appropriate gains or spill the beans without offering something of
equal value to the firm.
If insider trading is harmful at all, then, the compensation
should flow to all investors. As a practical matter this means to the
firm itself. Again the net harm is the transfer in the wrongdoer's
favor plus reductions in efficiency, all divided by the probability of
successful prosecution. The law of insider trading has moved
steadily in this direction. The remedy is now based squarely on the
insider's "profit," not on any "loss" sustained by other traders, and
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 permits a court to in-
crease the penalty up to threefold to take account of the substan-
tial likelihood that a secret trader will not be caught.56
This leaves some interesting questions about what "profit"
might mean. The statute defines profit as "the difference between
the purchase or sale price of the security and the value of that
security as measured by the trading price of the security a reasona-
ble period after" the nonpublic information has been dissemi-
nated.57 The cases have used similar formulations. This approach
is an application of the market model, because it defines the profit
(the value of the information) as the difference between the mar-
ket price of stock with information and the market price without.
The use of a "reasonable period" after the release of information
picks up the fact that the price of thinly traded stocks will not
adjust as quickly or as accurately as the price of stocks such as
IBM. It is therefore necessary to give the court discretion to ascer-
tain how responsive the price of a given stock is to new informa-
U See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309, 331-37; Easterbrook, Insider Trading as
an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81, 86-87 (J.
Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 629-34; Levmore,
Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 148-
52 (1982).
56 SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (lst Cir. 1983) (en banc), after remand, 725 F.2d 9
(1984); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 168-73 (2d Cir. 1980); Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.)
1264, 1264-65 (amending § 21(d) of the 1934 Act, to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A)).
57 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) at 1264 (adding 1934 Act § 21(d)(2)(C),
to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(C)).
[52:611
Optimal Damages in Securities Cases
tion. If there is a problem in this formulation, it is the lack of ref-
erence to an adjustment for the movement of the market in the
interim. The statute implicitly assumes that the market and indus-
try group remain constant. The longer the delay between the trade
and the release of the information, the less accurate this assump-
tion. The statute does not preclude an adjustment to remove mar-
ket movements-an adjustment as likely to enhance the award as
to reduce it. The adjustment is appropriate as an economic matter,
and it can be implied in the statute as part of the computation of
the purchase or sale price of the security.58
Judges Coffin and Bownes have argued for a different defini-
tion of "profit." They maintain that the trader's profit is the differ-
ence between the price he pays and the actual price he realizes
when he sells, even if the sale comes long after the release of infor-
mation.59 An insider buys stock for $10; after the information
comes out the price rises to $12; a year later the insider sells the
stock for $20. They would compute the profit as $10 rather than
$2. In some cases such a computation increases the damages in a
rough offset for the fact that detection is unlikely. This is the only
possible justification for what is otherwise an inaccurate computa-
tion. The insider's gain from his knowledge is $2; after the news is
out the insider is free to buy as much stock as he wants, and the
remaining $8 is a return to the insider's activity as a risk bearer.6 0
There is no reason to treat the reward to risk bearing in this stock
as a "profit" of the "inside information"; the insider's function
here is no different from his role as investor in any other firm of
which he had no knowledge. The stock might as easily have gone to
$4, or the insider might have sold at $12, bought the stock again,
and held. The gain from the prohibited conduct is $2 in any of
these cases. The insider's risk bearing, once the news is out, is a
socially productive activity that should not be penalized through
damages.
There is a nice parallel here to antitrust. If a firm joins a cartel
" This is how courts justify using a market adjustment in other parts of securities law.
See, e.g., Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980); Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
59 SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55-58 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Coffin, J., joined by
Bownes, J., dissenting in part).
6o This is a mirror image of the situation as the other investors see things. Those who
sold to the insider at $10 were free to reassess the wisdom of their sale and to buy new
stock, once the news came out, if the price of $12 appeared to be attractive. They did not
"lose" more than $2. The possibility of cover in the stock market-like cover in a contract
for the sale of peas-cuts off the damages on the day when the violation becomes clear and
the parties can secure in the market whatever quantities of the commodity they desire.
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and increases its price, and at the same time implements a new
technology to reduce the cost of production, it need not disgorge
the profit from the latter activity. It pays as damages only its "mo-
nopoly profit"-the difference between the competitive price
before the cartel and the new monopoly price. It keeps the profits
generated by any cost-reducing innovations that were made possi-
ble by the cartel. The requirement that it pay the "net harm" as
damages forces it to subtract from its calculation the monopoly
overcharge and then compare the benefits of lower costs against
the allocative efficiency losses of monopoly. The calculation would
be spoiled if courts computed all of the defendant's gains as illegal
profits. It is the same here; the calculation of illegal profit must be
limited to the gains produced by the undesirable portion of the
activity.
F. Brokers' Misconduct
We conclude with a brief look at misconduct by brokers in
dealing with their customers, a subject that is related only inciden-
tally to the principal purposes of the securities laws. Brokers often
exercise discretion over trading in customers' accounts. When the
value of the accounts falls, customers may charge the brokers with
violation of duties. They may say that the broker "churned" the
account to generate higher commissions, selected stocks not "suita-
ble" for the customer's income and age, or induced the customer to
buy stocks he would not have bought if left to his own devices.
These complaints have nothing to do with the securities them-
selves and everything to do with the broker's breach of the promise
to be an honest agent, but they raise a few issues of valuation.
For some years, the courts awarded damages based on the cus-
tomer's gross losses. If the broker induced the customer to
purchase stock in Firm Q, perhaps withholding the information
that the broker made a market in Q's stock, and Q later fell in
price, the court would award the difference between the price paid
and the price realized."1 This is a rescissionary measure of dam-
ages, putting on the broker the entire risk of the firm's success and
the entire risk of the stock market as a whole. Yet this is not a
subject on which deterrence should be absolute. How much disclos-
ure to make to a customer of a given level of sophistication, how
much trading to do in a discretionary account, and so on, is a judg-
ment call. There may be savings in revealing less, and the selection
"1 See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970).
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of an appropriate damages rule may induce brokers to reveal the
right amount to customers. A rule giving the customer the benefit
of any increase in the security's value while calling on the broker
to make up a deficit would not send appropriate signals. The cus-
tomer's losses match someone else's gains. They are not part of the
net harm.
Today courts almost never compute damages on the basis of
the customer's trading losses. They instead assume that markets
are reasonably efficient in pricing stock and that the customer
therefore gets what he pays for, even if it is not what he wanted to
buy. The risks of investment belong to the customer, who assumed
them intentionally even if he would have preferred a different
stock. One stock is as likely (ex ante) to rise or fall as another, and
therefore the decline in the value of the portfolio is not part of the
damages. On the other hand, any commissions generated by exces-
sive trading must be returned to the customer.2 This tracks the
line of optimal damages. The commissions are the bulk of the net
harm in brokers' misconduct cases. The commissions are transfers
away from the victims without offsetting benefit (except to the
wrongdoer); that would be reason enough to require their surren-
der. The reason is reinforced by the fact that excessive trading
consumes real resources-the time of brokers, exchanges, and
transfer agents. (There is no need to assess this loss as a separate
item of damages; the broker suffers these items as "automatic"
costs because it must pay for them out of the commissions.)
Courts sometimes take a different approach that is close to the
same thing. They say that the broker must compensate the cus-
tomer for the reduction in the value of the portfolio but that they
will "take out the market." Thus if the portfolio drops ten percent
and the market (or some other index) drops ten percent during the
same period, the broker is free of liability. The damages equal only
the amount by which the portfolio falls faster than the market. 3
At first glance, it looks like this is the same as a rule under which
brokers simply return the commissions. On average, the clients'
portfolios will do as well as the market. But of course not all cli-
ents will bring suit. Only those whose portfolios do worse than av-
erage sue, and brokers cannot recoup the shortfall from the other
clients whose portfolios beat the market. Thus this measure of
damages forces brokers to bear some of the risk of investment,
62 See Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1372-74 (7th Cir. 1983); cf. Ar-
rington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 620-22 (9th Cir. 1981).
11 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980).
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even though the courts set out to relieve them of that risk.
The courts that adjust for the market's movement in cases of
brokers' misconduct proceed by asking how the client's portfolio
did when compared with a larger portfolio of similar stocks. Sup-
pose the broker bought some very risky stocks for the client, say
stocks with f# coefficients of 2. A stock with a # coefficient of 2 rises
(and falls) roughly twice as fast as the market. To make things
simple, suppose the broker put the client's entire assets in one
such stock and the market promptly fell 10%. This stock would be
expected to fall 20%. Assume it fell 25%. The court making the
adjustment might reason: A portfolio of similar stocks would have
fallen 20%, so subtract 20% from the purchase price of this stock,
find the difference between that "adjusted purchase price" and the
price realized from selling the stock, and award the difference to
the client. This is fine if the client wanted a risky stock, one that
would rise and fall faster than the market, even if the client did
not want this particular stock. What if the client wanted a safe
portfolio, one that would rise and fall with the market, or even
more slowly than the market? Often the real problem in a brokers'
misconduct case is that the broker exposed the client to much
more risk than the client contemplated. If risk is the harm, then an
adjustment like the one we have described leaves the client with-
out compensation for the broker's default. Instead of comparing
the client's portfolio against a similarly risky portfolio, the court
should compare the client's portfolio against how the target risk
classification would have done. In the example we gave, the ad-
justed purchase price should be only 10% less than the actual one,
and the damages would be about 15% of the value of the initial
investment.6 4
"Rolf v. Blythe, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980), shows how the
court can miss this point. The broker put the client into an exceptionally high-risk group of
stocks (mostly start-up companies not traded on major exchanges). During the time covered
by this misconduct the Standard & Poors Industrial Index rose some 9.79%; the Standard &
Poors Low-Priced Index fell 7.5%. Id. at 84 n.9. (Negative correlation of these indices is a
rare but possible occurrence. The more volatile a group of stocks, the more likely something
like this can happen.) The court concluded that the basket of stocks purchased by the bro-
ker was "like" the Low-Priced Index and so deflated the adjusted purchase price by 7.5%.
Id. at 84. It would have been more appropriate to assume that the client wanted a safe
portfolio. Had the broker given him such a portfolio, it would have appreciated rather than
depreciated.
Rolf also illustrates another, though smaller, misfire. The court tried to make rough
adjustments using stock indices, which are efforts to measure the average performance of a
group of stocks. Indices have some notorious quirks, and they do not accurately represent
either the market as a whole or the relation between a particular stock and the market. It is
significantly more accurate to make adjustments of this sort using the market model de-
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This illustration suggests what we think the best measure of
net harm in brokers' misconduct cases: the excess risk produced by
the brokers' choices. The court could compute the extent to which
the portfolio the broker put together was riskier than an appropri-
ate target portfolio65 and award compensation that depends on
how far a well-chosen portfolio would be expected to outperform
the excessively risky one. Any client could obtain this compensa-
tion even if his portfolio later beat the market. The award should
be based on excess risk viewed ex ante, not on how things turned
out.
The client's object in giving a broker discretion over a securi-
ties account is to enable the broker to assemble a desirable portfo-
lio. Portfolio management is a skill, and the client seeks to hire the
broker's expertise. If the broker assembles a portfolio containing
excess risk, when the risk could have been hedged by diversifica-
tion or reduced by selecting different stocks, the broker has
harmed the client. Almost as bad, if the client fears that the broker
will not put together a well-designed portfolio, the client will try to
supervise the broker more carefully. Because the purpose of the
venture was to use the broker's comparative advantage, the client's
supervision is another economic cost of the agency relation. Com-
pensation based on excess risk is a substitute for excessive moni-
toring by clients, and it measures the real economic harm of poorly
designed portfolios.
CONCLUSION
The law of damages in securities cases is not as chaotic as it
first appears. The damages in cases involving the issuance of secur-
ities are based on some measure of "harm to investors," and
whether the standard is rescissionary is almost a detail because ad-
justments for changes in the market convert rescissionary mea-
sures into more conventional out-of-pocket-loss measures. Dam-
ages in almost all cases arising out of problems in the aftermarket
(both omissions and inside trading) are based on the wrongdoer's
profit. The difference between the loss-based measures and the
profit-based measures comes from the fact that trading in the
aftermarket entails offsetting gains and losses. Optimal sanctions,
scribed in Part I-C than to do it in this seat-of-the-pants fashion.
65 An "appropriate" target portfolio obviously depends on the degree of volatility the
client wanted to accept. The broker can obtain this volatility-yet maintain diversification
to avoid the costs of unsystematic risk-by careful decisions to borrow against or lend from
the portfolio, or to augment the portfolio with investments in market-index futures.
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based on the net harm an offender's acts cause to others, require
the offsetting of gains and losses. The rules largely do this. The
absence from securities law of benefit-of-bargain damages and con-
sequential damages also has a sound basis in the theory of optimal
sanctions. The congruence between theory and practice is not com-
plete; it could not be in light of the substantial difficulty in mea-
suring net harm even under the best conditions. It is nonetheless
interesting that things are as close as they appear to be.
